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Climate change presents a challenge to the fishing industry and managers alike. Changing 
environmental conditions affect fish location, abundance, and ecosystem relationships, which can 
result in dramatic shifts in economically important stocks. These shifts can stress management 
systems as well as the fishermen who depend on effective management.  
Climate-influenced changes present both challenges and opportunities. For example, New England 
cod stocks have dramatically declined in recent years—a trend attributed to rapid increases in ocean 
temperatures in the Gulf of Maine, combined with a management failure to account for those 
changes when setting quotas.1 The result was declaration of a federal disaster in 2012, reflecting the 
extreme hardships that the required cuts to quota imposed on industry.2 On the other hand, warm-
water species such as black sea bass have expanded their distribution northward, providing new 
fishing opportunities to fishermen in these areas.  
Effective and adaptive fisheries management systems are needed both to avoid economic and 
environmental dislocation associated with climate-driven changes in fish stocks and to enable the 
industry to take advantage of new opportunities. The legal literature has considered how frameworks 
can be designed to adapt to climate change in a variety of regulatory contexts. This article applies 
these legal theories of adaptive management to fisheries management systems in the U.S. In Part I, 
the article reviews the U.S. fishery management system, including federal, regional, and state 
management. Part II evaluates fisheries management legal frameworks against each of four adaptive 
management frameworks identified in the legal literature in order to identify where and how fisheries 
law enables or undermines resilience. In part III, this analysis is applied to a specific fishery—black 
sea bass—to illustrate how these insights are applied in practice. Part IV concludes that close 
consideration of specific procedural and substantive aspects of fisheries legal frameworks and 
                                                
1 Marianne Lavelle, Collapse of New England’s Iconic Cod Tied to Climate Change, SCIENCE, 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/10/collapse-new-england-s-iconic-cod-tied-climate-change . 
2 See Groundfish Disaster Economic Assistance Program, MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFF., 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/dfg/dmf/programs-and-projects/groundfish-disaster-economic-assistance-
program.html (last visited Sep. 7, 2017). 
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individual fisheries is needed to understand whether and how they enable adaptive management in 
the face of environmental change. 
1 The U.S. Fisheries Management System 
U.S. fisheries management is a complex system that includes separate federal, regional, and state 
frameworks that work together to govern fishing in state and federal waters. This section provides 
an overview of these management systems and how they interact in practice. 
 Federal Fisheries Management: The Magnuson Stevens Act  
Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, also known as 
the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA), in 1976 to regulate fishing in U.S. federal waters. The MSA is the 
primary statute governing marine fisheries from the seaward boundary of the territorial sea to the 
seaward extent of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 200 nautical miles from shore.3  
The MSA delegates responsibility for fisheries management in these waters to eight regional fishery 
management councils (FMCs). Each FMC is made up of members from each state in the region and 
from the regional office of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).4 In addition to the voting 
members, each council has four non-voting members who represent the United States Coast Guard, 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of State, and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Commission (ASMFC).5 
FMCs manage fisheries under their jurisdiction by establishing a fishery management plan (FMP) 
“for each fishery under its authority that requires conservation and management.”6 Once a FMP is 
complete and approved by the Council in compliance with the Act, NMFS issues regulations to 
implement the FMP.7 FMPs must contain mandatory elements and may contain discretionary 
elements, and they must be consistent with ten national standards set out in the Act.8 The 
mandatory elements include assessment of “the present and probable future condition” of the 
fishery, as well as its optimum yield, maximum sustainable yield, and “objective and measurable 
criteria” for determining when a stock is overfished.9 Each FMC must establish annual catch limits 
for the fishery based on a mechanism that must be set out in the FMP.10 If NMFS determines that a 
stock is overfished according to the criteria in a FMP, the FMC must amend the FMP to include 
                                                
3 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802 (defining EEZ); 1811(a) (declaring sovereign authority over fishing); 1853 (authorizing permits for 
fishing as element of FMPs). 
4 Id. §§ 1801(b)(5); 1852. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. § 1852(h)(1). 
7 16 U.S.C. § 1854. 
8 Id. §§ 1851 (national standards), 1853 (contents of FMPs). 
9 16 U.S.C. § 1853. 
10 Id. §§ 1852(h)(6) (requiring Council to set annual catch limits); 1853(a)(15) (requiring annual catch limit mechanism in 
FMPs). 
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measures sufficient to rebuild the stock within the shortest period possible, generally not to exceed 
10 years.11  
Status determination criteria and yield thresholds are based on stock assessments conducted by the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), as well as analysis from Council committees and 
panels.12 The MSA requires and authorizes FMCs to create committees and panels to support their 
work. Each council is required to establish a Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) “to assist it in 
the development, collection, evaluation, and peer review of [] statistical, biological, economic, social, 
and other scientific information,” including by approval of stock assessments and associated status 
determination criteria and yield thresholds for management of stocks under the Council’s 
management.13 Annual catch limits “may not exceed the fishing level recommendations” determined 
by SSCs.14 FMCs also may establish Advisory Panels, must establish a fishing industry advisory 
committee and must establish an advisory committee for any FMP or amendment for a highly 
migratory fishery that occurs in more than one region.15  
FMCs rely heavily on their committees and panels in carrying out their appointed tasks. For 
example, the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) uses Oversight Committees, 
Plan Development Teams, and Advisory Committees in addition to its SSC.16 Oversight Committees 
include council members and “generally relate[] to a specific fishery or important management 
issue.” They develop specific measures for inclusion in an FMP or an amendment or framework 
adjustment.17 The Advisory Panels provide the Oversight Committees with advice from stakeholders 
throughout the planning processes.18 Plan Development Teams provide the Oversight Committee 
with technical support on scientific, legal, and implementation issues.19 These panels and committees 
enable the FMC to create and implement FMPs.  
Some fisheries do not exist solely in a single fishery management region. The Secretary of 
Commerce, through NMFS, is responsible for managing specific highly migratory species (tuna, 
marlin, oceanic sharks, sailfishes, and swordfish).20 For other fisheries that “extend beyond the 
geographical area of authority of any one Council,” the Secretary may designate which FMC is 
responsible for developing the FMP for the fishery or require that multiple FMCs jointly manage the 
                                                
11 Id. § 1854(e). 
12 Richard D. Methot, Stock Assessment: Operational Models in Support of Fisheries Management, in THE FUTURE OF 
FISHERIES SCIENCE IN NORTH AMERICA 137, 142-44 (R.J. Beamish & B.J. Rothschild, eds., 2009) 
13 Id. § 1852(g)(1)(A). 
14 Id. § 1852(h)(1). 
15 Id. § 1852(g). 
16 See, e.g., New England FMC, History and Organizational Structure, http://www.nefmc.org/about/history (detailing New 
England FMC’s reliance on in conducting its business). 
17 Id.  
18 Id. (stating that Advisory Panels’ members consist of “…members from the fishing industry, scientists, environmental 
advocates, and others with knowledge and experience related to fisheries issues”). 
19 Id.  
20 Id. §§ 1852(a)(3), 1802(21) (defining highly migratory species) 
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fishery.21 In the case of joint management, one FMC will be designated the administrative lead for 
developing the FMP, but all involved FMCs must approve the resulting FMP before it can take 
effect.22  
In practice, different fisheries are managed in different ways.23 For example, the Mid-Atlantic FMC 
(MAFMC) serves as the sole responsible Council for the management of mackerel, squid, and 
butterfish.24 The New England FMC (NEFMC) therefore does not have voting authority on this 
FMP, although some of its members participate in management via the MAFMC committee 
structure.25 On the other hand, the spiny dogfish FMP is jointly managed by MAFMC and NEFMC, 
so both Councils must vote for management to take effect.26  
 State and Regional Fishery Management: Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Commission 
States retain jurisdiction over fishing in state waters, which in most states extends from shore out to 
3 nautical miles.27 States manage fishing for stationary species in their waters independently, but 
many stocks migrate or otherwise move across state boundaries. For these species, states have 
recognized the need for binding regional management to avoid overfishing.  
States have addressed the challenge of regional management by entering into interstate compacts 
creating regional fisheries management entities. In 1940, the 15 Atlantic Coast states created the 
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) by interstate compact in order to support 
“the better utilization of fisheries . . . of the Atlantic seaboard.”28 Each state member is represented 
on the Commission by 3 commissioners, and each state receives a vote on each issue before the 
commission.29 
The work of the ASMFC, like FMCs, is substantially supported through associated boards, 
commissions, and panels. ASMFC’s fisheries management is conducted pursuant to the Interstate 
Fisheries Management Program (ISFMP) charter.30 The ISFMP charter establishes a Policy Board, 
                                                
21 16 U.S.C. § 1854(f). 
22 50 C.F.R. § 600.111. 
23 See generally MAFMC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COUNCIL MANAGEMENT COORDINATION (Oct. 11, 2007). 
24 Telephone Interview with Jason Didden, Fishery Management Specialist, MAFMC (Aug. 22, 2019). 
25 Id. 
26 Id.; see also MAFMC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COUNCIL MANAGEMENT COORDINATION 11 (Oct. 11, 2007) 
(discussing joint management between MAFMC and NEFMC). 
27 Id. § 1856 (state jurisdiction). 
28 ATLANTIC STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMPACT at preface, Pub. L. No. 539, 56 Stat. 267, 1 (1950). 
29 Id. at art. III (commissioners); ASMFC COMPACT RULES AND REGULATIONS art III § 2 (voting). 
30 ASMFC, INTERSTATE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM CHARTER § 1 (2016) (citing ASMFC COMPACT RULES 
AND REGULATIONS, at art. IV.). 
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Species Management Boards, and additional committees and teams for technical and advisory 
support (Fig. 1).31 
• The ISFMP Policy Board includes all of the commissioners32 and is responsible for 
administration and management of the Commission.33  
• Species Management Boards are responsible for creating and implementing FMPs and are 
made up of Commissioners from the states that have “declared an interest in the species’ 
management program.”34  
• Technical Committees, Plan Review Teams, and Advisory Panels support each of the 
Species Management Boards.  
Atlantic regional fisheries management operates through “coastal FMPs” designed to prevent 
overfishing and maintain sustainable stocks of fish through scientifically-based management 
measures.35 The standards and procedures for coastal FMPs are set forth in the ISFMP Charter, in 
accordance with requirements established by Congress in the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative 
Management Act (ACFCMA), which provides guidance for coastal FMPs, federal-regional 
coordination, and state implementation of coastal FMPs.36  
                                                
31 Id. §§ 3-5. 
32 Id. (“The ISFMP Policy Board is comprised of the Commissioners from the fifteen member states and representatives 
of the District of Columbia (DC), the Potomac River Fisheries Commission (“PRFC”), NOAA Fisheries and the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service. It meets at least bi-annually to establish and monitor the program.”)  
33 ASMFC, INTERSTATE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM CHARTER, Preface, (2016), 
https://www.asmfc.org/files/pub/ISFMPCharter_Feb2016.pdf. 
34 Id. § 4(a). 
35 Id. § 6. 
36 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5108.  
Figure 1. ASMFC Structure. 
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The Act requires ASMFC to consult with the appropriate FMC when developing a coastal FMP for 
a stock that is located in both state and federal waters and to seek areas where federal and regional 
management can be complementary.37 The Secretary of Commerce can adopt regulations to enforce 
these coastal FMPs if no complementary federal FMP exists.38 In addition, the federal government 
must support and cooperate with ASMFC in interjurisdictional fisheries management, including in 
fisheries science and management.39  
Among other requirements, coastal FMPs must set out “[a] detailed statement on a state-by-state 
basis of each specific regulatory, monitoring, and research requirement that each state must 
implement in order to be in compliance with the plan.”40 The ACFCMA in turn requires states to 
implement and enforce coastal FMPs.41 Noncompliance with a coastal FMP by a state can result in a 
moratorium on fishing in that state42 and, for fisheries that also occur in federal waters, direct federal 
regulation of fishing in state waters.43 In practice, these management measures include specification 
of allowable catch each year, which may be allocated by region or by state. These state allocations 
control how much of a species is available to fishermen in each coastal state, and therefore play a 
central role in the ability of the FMP to adapt to changing conditions. 
2 Adaptive Management in US Fisheries Legal Frameworks 
Fisheries are changing, and fisheries management systems will have to adapt in order to successfully 
support sustainable stocks and industry. This section considers whether and how U.S. fishery 
management systems are prepared for these changes. This analysis is based on evaluation of fisheries 
management under theories of adaptive management developed by legal scholars. 
 Stationarity or a No-Analogue Future? 
Legal systems are often developed based on current and observed historical conditions. To be 
effective in the future, however, they must be able to adapt if and when those conditions change. 
Stationarity is the idea that “natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of 
variability.”44 This “envelope of variability” bounds the higher and lower expected change of a 
                                                
37 16 U.S.C. § 5104. 
38 Id. § 5103. 
39 Id. § 5103. 
40 ASMFC, INTERSTATE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM CHARTER § 6(b) (2016).  
41 16 U.S.C. § 5104. 
42 Id. § 5106. 
43 Id.  
44 P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573, 573 (2008); Robin Kundis Craig, 
“Stationarity is Dead” -- Long Live Transformation: Five Principles For Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
10, 15-17 (2010). 
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system throughout a year.45 Stationarity thus allows regulators to design policy for a defined range of 
predictable scenarios, which can simplify the task of regulation. 
A regulatory system based on stationarity assumptions can work effectively under observed past 
conditions but start to break down when conditions violate those assumptions. Climate change is 
causing environmental conditions to vary beyond the bounds of the stationarity envelope, resulting 
in fluctuations in natural systems that models may not be designed to predict and policies may not 
be designed to manage.46 As a result, both scientists and legal scholars now increasingly agree that 
stationarity is “dead” as a basis for climate-related regulation.47 Instead, we are entering a “no-
analogue future” where climate change is causing unprecedented changes in environmental 
conditions, and there is no historical basis for predicting where temperatures, sea levels, weather 
patterns, or any number of other factors will stabilize in time.48 Legal frameworks designed for a no-
analogue future are not based on defined parameters that serve as boundary conditions, but rather 
must assume that changing conditions represent the new normal. This section considers how 
fisheries management reflects stationarity and how it may be strained by changing conditions. 
U.S. fishery management reflects stationarity in its geographic assumptions. Federal fisheries 
management assigns management of fish stocks to a particular, geographically-delimited FMC.49 
However, changing ocean conditions may change or expand the range of managed stocks in 
unexpected ways. Intercouncil fisheries management tools are available for such situations, but the 
experience with joint management has been challenging, especially for states like Rhode Island that 
border two fishery management regions but are represented on only one.50 In addition, no formally-
defined triggers or other procedural mechanisms are provided for shifting responsibility for stock 
management from one council to another should the stocks move or expand their geographic range. 
As a result, commentators have noted that this management framework locks management authority 
for a given stock into the geographic range of that stock at a certain point in time.51 ASMFC 
membership, on the other hand, is inclusive of a wider geographic lens that allows the states 
interested in a stock to change over time—a more flexible management framework. As a result, 
limits on change in state allocations transition are likely to arise primarily from political forces (e.g., 
historical anchoring) than the structure of the management framework. 
                                                
45 Id. 
46 Craig, supra note 44, at 15-16. 
47 Craig Anthony Arnold, Adaptive Water Law, 62 KAN. L. REV., 1043, 1052 (2014). 
48 J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 394 (2010). 
49 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1). 
50 MAFMC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COUNCIL MANAGEMENT COORDINATION 34-38 (Oct. 11, 2007) (noting that a 
greater proportion of Rhode Island fish landings, both by value and by weight, arise from MAFMC-managed fisheries). 
51 Susan E. Farady, Moving Targets: Fisheries Management in New England in the Midst of Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 73, 78 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015) (noting geographic dispute related to 
authority over management of loligo squid). 
8 
Stock assessments and modeling efforts based on stationarity assumptions may not accurately 
capture changes in stocks in a no-analogue future, and they may provide misleading information to 
managers.52 As Szuwalski and Hollowed explain, “the tools currently used to manage exploited 
populations have shortcomings when applied to stocks for which population processes are changing 
over time. If the fisheries management community is going to continue to follow the current 
approach to setting harvest controls (i.e. setting management targets for individual species based on 
reference fishing mortalities and biomasses), the issue of non-stationarity should be addressed.”53 
For example, changing water temperatures may result in stock fluctuations that are not predicted by 
stationarity-based fisheries models, resulting in maximum sustainable yield and management 
determinations that do not effectively maintain stock biomass at desirable levels.54  
Stationarity limitations in fisheries science are indirectly linked to fisheries laws, most notably 
through National Standard 2. National Standard 2 requires that conservation and management 
measures be based on the best available science.55 This requirement has been the focus of extensive 
litigation in disputes over the scientific basis of management decisions, suggesting that NMFS has 
wide latitude in using available science, as long as its decisions are grounded in science and 
adequately explained.56 As a result, National Standard 2 is unlikely to restrict the use of stationarity 
assumptions in annual catch limit determination or rebuilding plans unless and until more accurate 
models are available. Once no-analogue future models are available, managers could be required to 
deploy them, with potentially unpredictable results on associated decisions, such as annual catch 
limits and rebuilding plans and timelines. 
 Preservationism and Transitionalism in Fisheries Management 
Preservationism and transitionalism provide a second lens through which legal scholars have viewed 
adaptive management. Preservationist policies adopt a baseline approach “where historical 
conditions are used to judge whether management or regulatory standards have been satisfied, or 
whether restoration or mitigation goals have been met.”57 Preservationist policies, such as protection 
                                                
52 See Cody S. Szuwalski & Anne B. Hollowed, Climate Change and non-stationary population processes in fisheries management, 73 
ICES J. MAR. SCI. 1297 (2016) (discussing bias in biomass estimates and management targets resulting from non-
stationary processes).  
53 Id. at 1301. See also Matthew J. S. Windle et al., Exploring spatial non-stationarity of fisheries survey data using 
geographically weighted regression (GWR): an example from the Northwest Atlantic, 67 ICES J. MAR. SCI. 145 (2010) (identifying 
improvements to fisheries model by addressing spatial non-stationarity). 
54 Id. 
55 16 U.S.C. § 1851. 
56 See, e.g. Flaherty v. Bryson, 850 F.Supp.2d 38 (D.D.C. 2012) (upholding NMFS acceptable biological catch rule because 
it was not required to select plaintiff's preferred model in the absence of contrary data); San Joaquin River Group 
Authority v. NMFS, 819 F.Supp.2d 1077 (E.D.Cal.2011) (considering bias corrections in management measures); The 
Ocean Conservancy v. Gutierrez, 394 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C.2005) (NMFS justified in considering studies, expert 
opinion, and considerations raised by the public in establishing rule). 
57 Eric Biber & Josh Eagle, When Does Legal Flexibility Work in Environmental Law?, 42 ECOL. L.Q. 787, 797 (2015) 
(“many scholars argue that current environmental and natural resources law relies heavily on a preservationist or baseline 
approach,”). Preservationism in this context is distinct from its meaning as an environmental norm for the use of natural 
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of an area as habitat for a particular species, embody the idea that natural systems can be maintained 
in perpetuity in their current condition or returned to a specified prior condition.58 Preservationism 
thus can be seen to implement stationarity assumptions.59  
Scholars tend to agree that preservationism is a problematic construct for regulations that will be 
affected by climate change.60 If climate change undermines baseline assumptions due to climate-
mediated changes to resources and habitats, preservationist policies may achieve their stated 
intentions. These critiques associate preservationism with a lack of flexibility and inability to adapt to 
changes of the magnitude expected with climate change.61 In addition, preservationist policies raise 
difficult questions of where the baselines should be set. 
Transitionalism can be viewed as a successor to preservationism.62 Transitionalism refers to legal 
regimes that are designed to manage for change, both procedurally and substantively.63 
Transitionalist conservation policy would seek to achieve two overarching principles: use of 
management tools (notably, techniques of habitat restoration and enhancement) to support 
transitional strategies, and focus on conservation of broader biodiversity goals rather than on 
preservation of particular species, purposes, or conditions.64 Transitionalism is thus inherently 
forward-looking in that it is designed to enable and encourage transformation and movement.65  
Fisheries management reflects both preservationist and transitional elements. From a preservationist 
perspective, fisheries management decisions are tightly tied to historical biomass, as estimated in 
FMPs.66 The use of historical biomass can be problematic under changing conditions: “if 
environmental conditions have changed, that which was virgin biomass in the past will not 
                                                                                                                                                       
resources, where it provides a contrast to exploitation. See Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the 
Elusive Great White Whale of Preservationism, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 385-387 (2009) (comparing 
exploitive, conservationist, and preservationist norms under the international whaling regime); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of 
Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 
HOUS. L. REV. 933, 992-993 (1997) (contrasting preservationism with “resourcism”).   
58 Ruhl, supra note 48, at 393. 
59 See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 48, at 395 (“if stationarity is dead in conservation science, preservationism is dead in 
conservation policy”). 
60 Ruhl, supra note 48, at 395; Craig, supra note 44, at 17; Biber & Eagle, supra note 57, at 797-98 (2015) (collecting 
sources). 
61 Ruhl, supra note 48, at 395; Biber & Eagle, supra note 57, at 797-800 (outlining substantive critiques and proposed 
reforms associated with preservationism). 
62 Id. at 394-95.  
63 Id. at 395-96. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
66 50 C.F.R. § 600.310 (establishing guidelines for national standard 1, including MSY and status determination criteria); 
NAT’L MAR. FISHERIES SERV., DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING OVERFISHING AND OVERFISHED 
STATUS 3, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/fisheries_eco/status_of_fisheries/archive/2013/methodology.pdf.  
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necessarily be the same as could be achieved in the absence of fishing today.”67 In such cases, stock 
status determinations and resulting annual catch limits or rebuilding plans may be unrealistic, 
resulting in unexpected management outcomes.68 For example, a stock deemed overfished may not 
be capable of recovery69—a situation that arguably may be occurring in the case of Atlantic cod70—
or may recover in a different time period than expected. 
On the other hand, some commentators argue that fisheries management is extremely flexible and 
responsive to changing conditions, an approach that can be characterized as highly transitionalist. In 
particular, Professors Eric Biber and Josh Eagle note that managers can and do rapidly respond to 
changing conditions through a variety of discretionary mechanisms, including incorporating new 
science, altering optimum yield determinations, and amending stock models used to establish catch 
targets.71 Using these and other procedural tools, “the fisheries governance system has managed to 
produce thousands of annual management measures for the hundreds of fisheries under 
management for nearly forty years.”72 Indeed, they conclude that FMCs had so much flexibility prior 
to the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act that their decisions were not successful in producing MSY 
from stocks under management.73 Fishermen transitioned among stocks in response to resultant 
stock declines.74 
The coastal lobster fishery of southern New England is a prime example of a transitionalist 
approach to fisheries management.75 Managers of this fishery had known for several years that the 
                                                
67 John K. Pinnegar & Georg H. Engelhard, The ‘Shifting Baseline’ Phenomenon: A Global Perspective, 18 REVIEWS IN FISH 
BIOL. & FISHERIES 1, 2 (2008) 
68 Id. at 1-2 (2008) (“The emergence of precautionary management has resulted in greater emphasis on fisheries 
‘reference points’. Chief among these precautionary reference points has been the biomass of the stock relative to 
assumed ‘virgin stock size’ (B0). In most fisheries assessments, estimating virgin biomass (B0) depends either on 
extrapolating back to well before we began to have reliable data or on taking estimates of annual recruitment and 
calculating what virgin biomass these would have produced in the absence of fishing pressure. All such calculations are 
highly subjective.” (internal citations omitted)). 
69 Szuwalski & Hollowed, supra note 52, at 1299 (discussing “one-way trips” that occur “when a stock has been depleted 
to a small fraction of the estimated unfished biomass or its proxy and then it does not recover when fishing pressure is 
reduced.”) 
70 The connection between cod stocks and climate change is debated in the scientific literature. Keith M. Brander, 
Climate change not to blame for cod population decline, 1 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 262 (2018) (comparing North Sea and Gulf 
of Maine cod stocks to suggest that fishing pressure, not climate change, is causing decline of Gulf of Maine cod); AJ 
Pershing et al., Slow adaptation in the face of rapid warming leads to collapse of the Gulf of Maine cod fishery, 350 SCIENCE 809 
(2015) (arguing that climate change is primary driver for Gulf of Maine cod decline). 
71 Biber & Eagle, supra note 57, at 802-04. 
72 Id. at 803. 
73 Id. at 808 (“[S]tocks improved as the law became less flexible--i.e., as it imposed greater constraints on the discretion 
of management councils and NOAA.”). 
74 Daniel Pauly et al., Fishing Down Marine Food Webs, 279 SCIENCE 860 (1998) (tracking changes in species landed by 
fishing industry over time). 
75 Farady, supra note 51, at 74-76. 
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stock was failing as a result of environmental drivers and continued fishing pressure.76 By 2013, 
ASMFC concluded that its members doubted the stock’s ability to rebuild to historical levels, but 
instead of closing the fishery, managers allowed it to continue.77 This decision was based on the 
uncertainty that the southern New England lobster stock would recover even with a full 
moratorium; instead, it was decided that the best course of action would be instead to allow the 
stock to continue to be depleted while the fishermen were transitioned to fishing other stocks.78  
Rhode Island has implemented the expected transitional management in the lobster fishery primarily 
through a shift to Jonah crab. Jonah crab is an increasingly important species in southern New 
England, including Rhode Island, due to increased landings and market value.79 Rhode Island has 
limited eligibility for participation in the increasingly important commercial Jonah crab fishery to 
fishermen with a lobster trap allocation,80 a step that makes sense due to the similarity of lobster and 
crab gear and to allow lobster fishermen to replace lost earnings with increased crab catch. While the 
long-term sustainability of this approach is uncertain,81 it embodies the transitionalism concept 
through the reservation of an entire stock for fishermen who are participants in a related, declining 
fishery. 
The decline of the southern New England lobster fishery and transition to Jonah crab can be seen as 
an embodiment of transitionalism over preservationism. A preservationist approach would have 
placed a moratorium on lobster harvest in order to allow these stocks to recover, and likely would be 
required for stocks managed under the MSA. At the federal level, the amendments to the MSA in 
1996 and 2007 constrained the procedural flexibility available to FMCs, including through 
requirements to determine annual catch limits, deploy accountability measures to prevent 
overfishing, and impose rebuilding plans on short timeframes upon a determination that a stock is 
overfished.82 Under these provisions, FMCs are more constrained than the ASMFC in 
implementation of transitional management approaches. 
                                                
76 ASMFC American Lobster Technical Committee, Recruitment Failure in the Southern New England Lobster Stock 
(2010). 
77 Farady, supra note51, at 84. 
78 Id. at 84-85. 
79 ASMFC, INTERSTATE FISHERY MANAGEMENT FOR JONAH CRAB 1 (2015). 
80 25-8 R.I. CODE R. § 4:15.5.2(B). 
81 The ASMFC developed a FMP for Jonah crab in response to concerns over the sustainability of the rapidly growing 
fishery, which targets a species at a lower trophic level than lobster which has a largely unknown life history and 
biomass. See ASMFC, INTERSTATE FISHERY MANAGEMENT FOR JONAH CRAB (2015). 
82 See Lindsay Walton, Introduction to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL 
LAW 65, 67-68 (Randall S. Abate, ed. 2015) (discussing amendments to MSA). 
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 Command and Control 
”Command and control” regulatory systems operate by establishing prescriptive standards of 
conduct.83 Because these systems are seen as rigid, they may be considered incompatible with 
adaptation to changing conditions. This rigidity is one of several criticisms of command-and-control 
systems, which are widely seen as problematic in the legal literature.84 Legal scholars have advocated 
for a range of reforms for command-and-control frameworks, notably including the use of flexible, 
market-driven or self-regulatory mechanisms to increase the efficiency of regulatory systems.85  
Legal commentary on fisheries management has been consistent with broader arguments against 
command-and-control and advocating for market-driven regulatory systems.86 Commentators 
characterize fisheries management as a prototypical command-and-control system because it is 
complex and prescriptive.87 Fishing regulations may comprehensively dictate how the fishing 
industry operates: when fishing can occur, how much of a given stock can be caught each trip, what 
gear or vessels may be used to catch it, when it can be landed, to whom it can be sold, among other 
requirements. 
Market-driven management systems, such as individual fishing quotas (IFQ) or “catch shares,” have 
been presented as an alternative.88 Catch share systems remove certain fisheries regulations—
typically, those related to effort restrictions, such as seasons and trip limits, and allow fishermen 
flexibility to catch a certain amount of fish on an annual basis rather than during a short season. 
However, these systems do not affect other fisheries regulations, such as stock assessment and yield 
determination processes and some gear restrictions (e.g., circle hooks or mesh size requirements to 
address bycatch). In this respect, fisheries market-management systems are consistent with other 
                                                
83 Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 559-660 (2012) (quoting James E. Krier & 
Richard B. Stewart, Using Economic Analysis in Teaching Environmental Law: The Example of Common Law Rules, 1 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 13, 15n.3 (1980)) (“Although ‘command and control’ has become widely used short-hand in 
contemporary legal circles, it is rarely defined and its meanings and functions have become either submerged or taken 
for granted. . . . A 1980 article by James Krier and Richard Stewart provides an early definition of the term: ‘As the 
phrase perhaps implies, this regulatory approach typically proceeds by imposing rigid standards of conduct . . . backed 
up by sanctions designed to assure full compliance with such standards . . . .’”). 
84 Id. at 662-663 (coding concerns as “bureaucracy, coercive, costly, end-of-pipe, ineffective, inefficient, information, 
interest group, legalistic, and uniform.”) 
85 See id. at 662-668; Daniel C. Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century Environmental Regulation to 21st Century 
Sustainability, 47 ENVTL. L. 1 (2017) (arguing for broad shift toward market-based regulatory structures and incentives). 
86 Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 393 (1999). 
87 Id. at 398-99. 
88 Id.; see also NOAA, NOAA CATCH SHARE POLICY (2010), 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/management/catch_shares/about/documents/noaa_cs_policy.pdf. 
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legal systems, where “most of the market approaches that have been used in the United States 
operate within the standard command-and-control framework.”89  
While command-and-control regulatory systems, including fisheries management, have been 
criticized, the relationship between these systems and climate resilience have received surprisingly 
little attention to date. However, three of the catalogued complaints about command-and-control 
systems appear to implicate resilience, including rigidity, “end-of-pipe” approach, and informational 
limitations. The remainder of this section assesses each of these critiques in the context of fisheries 
management and climate resilience.  
2.3.1 Rigidity in Fisheries Management 
The rigidity critique of command-and-control systems suggests that regulatory systems based on 
complex systems of rules are too rigid and inflexible to effectively govern90—or to adapt to changing 
conditions. While fisheries management is undoubtedly complex, legal commentators have noted 
that systems of rules are not necessarily inflexible or difficult to change.91 Fisheries management, in 
particular, is among the nimblest regulatory systems from both a procedural and a substantive 
perspective.92  
From a procedural perspective, fisheries managers have demonstrated an ability to effectively 
manage within the constraints of federal and state rulemaking requirements. Managers use regulatory 
amendments to set new annual measures in every fishery under management, as well as to rapidly 
respond to new information when required, such as through adjustment of catch limits.93 In 
addition, FMCs have developed framework adjustment processes to enable them to change FMPs 
without the need to conduct the multi-year process of developing a new plan amendment.94 While 
some management actions, such as full FMP amendment, may require long processes, the evidence 
to date does not suggest that the command-and-control structure of fisheries management has 
caused procedural rigidity that would undermine response to climate change.95 
                                                
89 Daniel H. Cole, Environmental Instrument Choice in a Second-Best World: A Comment on Professor Richards, 10 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 287, 289 (2000) (quoting J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 15 (1998)). 
90 Short, supra note 83, at 689 n.281 (collecting articles); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive 
System: How to Clean up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 940 (1997). 
91 Short, supra note 83, at 987; Cole, supra note 89, at 293 n.39 (citing Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy 
Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 264 (2000)) (noting that “one of the primary advantages of 
hierarchical instruments (i.e., direct regulations) is that they allow rapid adaptation to changes.”). 
92 Biber & Eagle, supra note 57, at 802-808. 
93 Id. at 802-03 (noting that “in practice the fisheries governance system has managed to produce thousands of annual 
management measures for the hundreds of fisheries under management for nearly forty years”). 
94 Dan Gourlie, Reeling in Uncertainty: Adapting Marine Fisheries Management to Cope with Climate Effects on Ocean Ecosystems, 47 
ENVTL. L. 179, 220-221 (2017) (noting limitations of framework adjustment for rapid response). 
95 Lawmakers have expressed concern that a recent Executive Order seeking regulatory repeals may undermine the 
rulemaking necessary for federal fisheries management. Letter from Raúl M. Grijalva, Ranking Member, U.S. House of 
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Fisheries management structures also provide substantive flexibility that may support resilient 
approaches to changing conditions. FMCs and regional entities have broad discretion to set harvest 
levels as well as to identify the most appropriate management measures to achieve those levels at the 
state and regional levels.96 Managers may not deploy these tools regularly to adapt fisheries 
management approaches in practice—for example, regional bodies such as ASMFC may be slow to 
reallocate quota from state to state in response to changing conditions, a political judgement that 
protects entrenched fishermen and related businesses. However, fisheries managers at both the 
federal and regional levels do have sufficient legal authority to change management measures and 
yield targets more proactively if they should so choose.  
2.3.2 End-of-Pipe Regulation in Fisheries Management 
The “end-of-pipe” critique of command-and-control systems is that they mitigate impacts through 
regulations instead of establishing systems that empower industries to avoid those impacts in the 
first place.97 “End-of-pipe”-style regulations could, in theory, undermine climate adaptation efforts 
by preventing industry from adopting new or different technology to adapt to changing conditions. 
While commentators have noted that command-and-control systems often contain mechanisms or 
incentives allowing creative and novel solutions,98 the “end-of-pipe” critique suggests a shift from 
specific technological requirements to market-driven regulations that allow industry to determine 
how to achieve required outcomes.99  
The “end-of-pipe” critique can be applied primarily to the aspects of fisheries regulations that seek 
to avoid negative impacts—notably, bycatch and overfishing. Some bycatch avoidance regulations 
work through prescriptive gear limits, such as the mesh size restrictions in the New England 
groundfish trawl fishery.100 Other regulations are less prescriptive, such as the limits on incidental 
catch of haddock in the northeast herring mid-water trawl fishery.101 Under this system, the herring 
                                                                                                                                                       
Reps. Comm. on Nat’l Res. And Jared Huffman, Ranking Member, U.S. House of Reps. Subcomm, on water, Power, 
and Oceans, to President Donald Trump (Feb. 2, 2017) (“We are writing today to express our grave concern over the 
executive order . . . requiring federal agencies to, among other things, identify at least two regulations to be repealed 
when proposing a new regulation. . . . All fisheries that take place in federal waters require regulatory action to open and 
close seasons, set catch limits, modify conservation and management measures, or adjust participation eligibility 
requirements. In many cases, multiple regulations must be enacted each year for a single fishery and that is a good thing . 
. .”). While this order may affect some types of fisheries rulemakings, it does not apply to actions needed to manage 
fisheries on an ongoing basis because they are not “significant.” See, e.g. Atlantic Highly Migratory Species: Atlantic 
Bluefin Tuna Fisheries, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,047 (Aug. 17, 2017) (noting inapplicability of Executive Order 13,771 because 
temporary closure of tuna fishery is not a significant rulemaking under Executive Order 12,866).  
96 Id. at 803-06 (noting legislative changes to reduce discretion).  
97 Short, supra note 83, at 690 n.282 (collecting articles). 
98 Id. (noting that environmental statutes are based on performance standards, not on the use of specific technologies, 
and that regulated entities can adopt a range of approaches to meet those standards). 
99 Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 550-51 
(2007). 
100 50 C.F.R. § 648.80. 
101 50 C.F.R. § 648.86(a)(3). 
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fishery is constrained once it reaches a maximum level of haddock bycatch.102 Bycatch caps enable 
fishermen to avoid bycatch by any means rather than through a single required method—an 
approach that heeds “end-of-pipe” critiques. However, the practical experience of such caps can be 
difficult—for example, the mid-water herring fishery was essentially closed for months in 2016 after 
hitting its cap.103 Climate change may affect bycatch, however regulated, as it changes the 
distributions and characteristics of fish stocks. However, these changes may cause particular 
challenges in systems such as Atlantic herring, in which fishermen are responsible for avoiding 
bycatch rather than relying on set gear restrictions as a safe harbor. 
Efforts to avoid overfishing are based on management measures to achieve yield targets. 
Historically, management measures employed effort limitations to meet these targets, including 
through daily or trip-based possession limits and fishing seasons.104 Market-based management, in 
the form of catch share systems, has more recently been employed to offer fishermen more 
flexibility in when and where to fish.105 While effort-based and catch-share systems have many 
differences, it is not clear that one or the other is better prepared for changing environmental 
conditions. Instead, both are ultimately intended to achieve yield targets, which themselves will 
change as individual stocks fluctuate. Efforts to shift fisheries management from single-species yield 
targets to overall ecosystem health, through “fishery ecosystem plans” or other ecosystem-based 
management systems, could have a greater impact by allowing fishermen to alter target stocks within 
an ecosystem over time as stocks shift in response to changing conditions.106  
2.3.3 Informational Deficits in Fisheries Management 
The informational deficit critique of command-and-control systems applies to management under 
changing conditions. This critique argues that “regulators lack information held by regulated entities 
that is essential to effectively dispatching their jobs. This makes regulation both costly and ill-
informed.”107 To address informational deficits, command-and-control systems often include 
information-gathering or disclosure mechanisms to transfer knowledge from industry to 
regulators.108 In the climate change context, informational deficits may be problematic if regulated 
                                                
102 See NMFS, Atlantic Herring Fishery: Changes to Haddock Incidental Catch Measures (Sep. 14, 2011) (explaining 
system). 
103 Laurie Schreiber, Herring v. Haddock in Data Debate, FISHERMAN’S VOICE, Feb. 2016, 
http://www.fishermensvoice.com/archives/201602Index.html.  
104 NMFS, NOAA Catch Share Policy (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/webdam/download/64669109.  
105 Id. 
106 See E.K. Pikitch et al., Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management, 305 SCIENCE 346 (2004) (advocating for shift from single-
species to ecosystem approach). 
107 Short, supra note 83, at 691, 691 n.286 (collecting articles); David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach 
to Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1523 (2014) (“Command and control regulations will be an important first step to prevent 
contamination but cannot address all risks, particularly those for which industry has more knowledge than agencies.”). 
108 Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 113 (2015) (identifying typology of strategies for 
addressing informational deficits in governance systems). 
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entities are aware of changing conditions, but regulators are not. In such cases, decisions may be 
tailored to past conditions but suboptimal for the present and future. 
Fisheries managers must make decisions in the face of uncertainty about the status and trends of fish 
stocks. These decisions are based on data and interpretive models obtained from fishery-dependent 
and fishery-independent sources.109 Both federal and regional management are subject to substantive 
and procedural limitations on how they apply these data. For example, procedural mechanisms such 
as the SSCs are required to ensure that managers deploy scientific information effectively,110 and 
substantive requirements like National Standard 2 require the use of the best available scientific 
information.111  
Rapid changes in marine ecosystems may strain the ability of existing data sources to support 
effective management decisions. Fishermen may perceive changes in the abundance and range of 
fish populations before these changes are reflected in stock assessments, model outputs, or 
management decisions such as state allocations. In such cases, expansion of fishery-dependent data 
collection could be one among an array of options for reducing informational deficits and ensuring 
that management decisions remain well-matched to actual conditions. 
 Principled Flexibility  
Professor Robin Kundis Craig has proposed “principled flexibility” as the aspirational standard to 
which environmental regulations should aspire in an age of climate change. She defines this 
construct to mean that:  
both the law and regulators (1) distinguish in legally significant ways uncontrollable climate 
change impacts from controllable anthropogenic impacts on species, resources, and 
ecosystems that can and should be actively managed and regulated, and (2) implement 
consistent principles for an overall climate change adaptation strategy, even though the 
application of those principles in particular locations in response to specific climate change 
impacts will necessarily encompass a broad and creative range of adaptation decisions and 
actions.112 
Professor Craig identifies promotion of principled flexibility in natural resource management as one 
of five principles for climate adaptation. This approach includes flexibility in management when 
facing climate-mediated changes. For example, climate change may increase water temperature, 
resulting in degradation of water quality for fish and triggering restrictions on pollution in order to 
return the watercourse to its prior state.113 A principled flexibility approach would recognize that 
                                                
109 PATRICK KILDUFF ET AL., ASMFC, GUIDE TO FISHERIES SCIENCE AND STOCK ASSESSMENTS 7-14 (Tina L. Berger, 
ed. 2009) (discussing types and uses of data sources). 
110 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(1)(A). 
111 Id. § 1851(a)(2). 
112 Craig, supra note 44, at 17-18. 
113 Id. at 64. 
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imposition of restrictions will not solve the problem and allow a “climate adaptation” exemption to 
avoid inefficiency and wasted effort—provided that the responsible agency can demonstrate the 
impossibility of accomplishing its regulatory mandate.114 Flexibility to implement adaptive 
management mechanisms is also needed, including the ability to make regular changes in regulations 
in response to changing conditions.115 Substantively, decisions would be made on a “no regrets” 
basis that seeks to be beneficial even if projected changes do not occur as expected.116 
Fisheries management laws and regulations incorporate a variety of mechanisms consistent with 
principled flexibility. For example, the minimum stock size threshold used to determine overfished 
status can be informed by life history fluctuations or “other considerations.”117 The guidelines for 
National Standard 2 require inclusion of “the relevant range of scientific disciplines” and 
acknowledgement of information gaps and identification of assumptions and uncertainty.118 
Similarly, National Standard 6 requires that conservation and management measures must account 
for variation in fisheries, and its associated guidelines call for an adequate buffer for conservation to 
avoid overfishing—a “no regrets” policy.119 The administrative functioning of fisheries management 
is also highly adaptive, as regulations to accomplish critical tasks (e.g., season openers and closures, 
yield target determinations) are issued at least annually. Further, the practical experience with the 
southern New England lobster fishery suggests that policy makers have substantial discretion to 
allow reductions in biomass of stocks impacted by climate change.  
In many respects, then, fisheries management appears consistent with principled flexibility—
although managers have rarely explicitly distinguished the influences of climate change from 
anthropogenic influences. This may be starting to change, however. For example, NOAA Fisheries 
has developed a climate science strategy intended in part to ensure compliance with the best 
available science mandate under the MSA—an important step towards identification of controllable 
impacts and adaptation principles.120 
These examples suggest that fisheries management includes substantial flexibility, but that flexibility 
is associated only in limited circumstances with the explicit, legally-significant constraints and climate 
strategies needed for it to be considered “principled flexibility” as defined by Professor Craig.  
                                                
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 66. 
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117 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(e)(2)(ii)(B). See also Craig, supra note 44, at 46-48 (suggesting that yield criteria, and in particular 
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119 16 U.S.C. § 1851; 50 C.F.R. § 600.335. 
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eds., 2015). 
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3 Black Sea Bass: Management of a Changing Fishery  
Consideration of the ability of fisheries management systems to adapt to changing conditions can be 
illustrated through a case study applying theoretical considerations to a specific context. This section 
applies the discussion in the prior section to the Atlantic black sea bass fishery—a complex fishery 
that is experiencing rapid change.  
 Fishery Overview 
The black sea bass (Centropristis striata) is a bottom-dwelling, predatory fish often found near reefs 
and sheltered bottom areas.121 The fish can grow up to be around two feet in length and may live for 
fifteen to twenty years.122 Adults generally migrate north and inshore to follow warming water 
temperatures in the spring and then travel back south and offshore during the fall.123  
Black sea bass is a popular species that is harvested by a variety of gear types in both coastal and 
offshore waters across the entire Atlantic coast.124 Commercially, otter trawl gear accounts for 65% 
of catch, while fish pots and traps, lobster traps, hand lines, and other gear are also used.125 Because 
the species crosses jurisdictional lines, the MAFMC and the ASMFC cooperatively manage the black 
sea bass fishery from North Carolina to Canada as a single stock under Amendment 9 of the 
Summer Flounder, Scup and Black Sea Bass FMP, as amended, which MAFMC created in 
cooperation with NEFMC, the South Atlantic FMC, and NMFS.126 NMFS has issued regulations to 
implement the FMP.127 
Over the past few years, the black sea bass stock has been shifting northwards in correlation with 
rising ocean temperatures.128 For example, over thirty percent of the total catch of black sea bass in 
both 2016 and 2017 was caught in sector 616, which is located directly east of the coast of New 
Jersey and south of Long Island. 129 This catch represents a substantial increase from 2014 and 2015, 
when sector 616 was only responsible for sixteen percent and thirteen percent, respectively, of the 
                                                




124 MAFMC, BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY INFORMATION DOCUMENT 4 (2017). 
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126 See MAFMC, Fishery Management Plan and Amendments: Summer Flounder, Scup, Black Sea Bass, 
http://www.mafmc.org/fisheries/fmp/sf-s-bsb.  
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128 MAFMC, Black Sea Bass Fishery Information Document (2017). 
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129 MAFMC, Black Sea Bass Fishery Information Document (2016), 
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total catch.130 The increases in northerly sectors contrast against declines in more southerly areas. 
Similarly, state contributions to black sea bass recreational landings have shifted northwards.131 For 
example, New Jersey contributed 38 percent of recreational landings in 2012, but only 12 percent in 
2016.132 Conversely, Connecticut landings increased from six percent in 2012 to 17 percent in 
2016.133 This trend has led to “extremely high availability” of fish in northern states, which is 
contributing to recreational quota overages “despite very restrictive management measures”134 and 
contributing to high levels of discard in commercial fisheries.135 
Black sea bass has historically been considered a “data-poor stock,” and several models for mapping 
the population have been rejected due to the uncertain nature of the survey data, resulting in calls 
for additional fishery-independent surveys to be conducted in order to more accurately survey the 
fish stocks.136 A benchmark stock assessment was completed and reviewed in 2016 by the Stock 
Assessment Review Committee, resulting in changes to the stock assessment model and 
development of new biological reference points for the species.137  
In 2017, the MAFMC SSC accepted the revised stock assessment model for use in setting 
overfishing limits for black sea bass management.138 The stock assessment indicates that the stock is 
neither overfished nor undergoing overfishing.139 The model estimates that spawning stock 
biomass—the threshold indicator for minimum stock size, is 2.3 times greater than the level at MSY, 
and fishing mortality (0.27) was less than the threshold mortality for MSY (0.36).140 Both biomass 
and fishing mortality levels indicate that the stock is substantially healthier than in previous years, 
when biomass at times fell below the minimum stock size threshold (particularly prior to federal 
management).141 
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The fishery management plan divides the black sea bass stock between the recreational fishery and 
the commercial fishery; the recreational fishery receives 51% of the total quota and the commercial 
fishery receives 49%.142 Under this formula for the year 2017, 4.12 million pounds of black sea bass 
was allocated to the commercial fishery and 4.29 million pounds was allocated to the recreational 
fishery.143 These quota allocations incorporate a buffer, so that they are less than the annual catch 
limits for both the commercial and the recreational sectors.144 In past years, commercial sector 
landings have closely approximated quota, while recreational landings have routinely exceeded 
quota, including landings of 184% of quota in 2016.145  
The commercial black sea bass quota is divided among the states on a state-by-state basis.146 The 
ASMFC established these state allocations in 2002, during the development of Amendment 13 to 
the FMP, to allocate fishing by state under the new federal coastwide quota system, which was 
intended in part to avoid possible inequities as the landings shifted northwards.147 The ASMFC 
renewed these state allocations in 2004 for the years 2005-07.148 It then renewed them without 
expiration in 2007,149 and the original allocation percentages remain in effect today.  
Under the state allocation system, each state is responsible for managing its own commercial fishery, 
primarily through input controls such as time and area closures and license limitation schemes.150 
States must also comply with coastwide restrictions. Coastwide specifications for the commercial 
fishery include minimum commercial size, minimum net mesh size, and escape vent size and 
placement on traps and pots.151 Coastwide recreational specifications include minimum size, 
possession limit, and season restrictions, which since 2011 have been set separately for the northern 
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and southern states in order to constrain recreational catch in areas where sea bass are highly 
available and quota overages occurring.152  
The Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (RIDEM) manages commercial and 
recreational fisheries in the state, including for black sea bass.153 Rhode Island receives 11 percent of 
the commercial black sea bass allocation, which totaled approximately 453,200 pounds in 2017.154 
Rhode Island requires its commercial fishermen to obtain a Restricted Finfish endorsement.155 
Endorsements are limited based on a “rotating door” licensing system with a 1:1 exit/entry ratio. 
Under this system, one new license with a restricted finfish endorsement is available for every one 
license with a restricted finfish endorsement that is not renewed.156 The state regulations split the 
year into six seasons, each with its own catch limit.157 For example, the January 1 to April 30 season 
is allocated twenty-five percent of the state’s quota, and fishermen are allowed to land 750 pounds 
of black sea bass per week during this period.158 The fishery is closed from August 1 until September 
14.159 RIDEM regulations also implement the required gear requirements and minimum size limits—
fifteen inches for recreational and eleven inches for commercial, as well as daily or weekly 
possession limits that vary by season.160 
 Climate Change Impacts on the Black Sea Bass Fishery 
The black sea bass fishery is changing rapidly along with changing environmental conditions. As a 
result, it is a useful case study to illustrate how the theories of climate adaptation discussed in section 
2 may play out in practice. This section provides evaluates the fishery on each of the adaptation 
theories. 
3.2.1 Stationarity 
The black sea bass fishery exhibits stationarity primarily in a mismatch between the location of the 
stock and its managers. While understanding of the fishery has improved as the stock has shifted 
northwards, that range shift has not affected responsibility for management or allocations of fishing 
rights on a state level.  
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From a fishery science perspective, the shifting stock range and high levels of availability noted in 
the northern states suggests that the stock may have shifted outside of its historic geographic 
envelope of variability. This potential violation of stationarity conditions does not appear to have led 
to inadequate or unrealistic stock models, however, due to continued scientific investment. As the 
black sea bass has long been considered a data-poor stock, managers have worked to better 
understand the stock and to develop realistic stock assessment models, even as the stock has been 
changing. As the most recent model was adopted within the last calendar year,161 it is likely that it 
captures the dynamic movement of the stock since 2002. Moreover, this model produced new status 
determination criteria,162 which may be effectively matched to conditions in effect when the model 
was developed.  
While investments in black sea bass modeling may avoid stationarity issues from a scientific 
perspective, the management structure for the species illustrates procedural stationarity at both 
federal and regional levels. The federal Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Council (MAFMC) is responsible for 
management of the federal black sea bass fishery and FMP, but a substantial portion of the stock 
under federal management now exists in states that are not members of the MAFMC and therefore 
not represented by council members with voting powers.163 For example, Rhode Island is home to 
an increasing share of the Black Sea Bass fishery, but is a voting member only of the NEFMC. While 
the NEFMC is consulted on issues related to the black sea bass FMP, consultation is not equivalent 
to direct management responsibility. This mismatch is similar to a range shift affecting loligo squid, 
which gave rise to efforts (unsuccessful to date) to add Rhode Island to the MAFMC.164 
Regional black sea bass management does not create a geographic mismatch between the regulators 
and stock because all states in the black sea bass range are ASMFC members. However, the ASMFC 
has not updated or changed its state quota allocations since they were initially negotiated in 2002, 
based on historical harvest as far back as 1988.165 While the creation of set state allocations was 
intended to avoid inequity as the stock shifted northward,166 continuation of the initial allocations 
over such a long period suggests that those allocations are not linked to the evolving geographic 
range and prevalence of the species. This static allocation may avoid economic dislocation to the 
industry in southerly states where stocks are declining, but it may conversely result in higher bycatch 
and related discard mortality—and a missed economic opportunity for fishers—in northerly states 
with lower allocations but larger stocks. 
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As described in the previous section, the recent adoption of a new stock assessment model and 
status determination criteria suggest that managers are attempting to model the black sea bass stock 
as it exists today, rather than to anchor it in a past condition. In this respect, its status as a data-poor 
stock may provide an advantage to managers. Future decisions about deployment and further 
evolution of the model and related criteria will determine whether the system seeks to preserve 
current conditions or continues to evolve with the changing stock dynamics.  
The fishery does exhibit preservationism in how quota is allocated by the ASMFC. Black sea bass 
state quota allocations have been unchanged for a long period and do not appear to be transitioning 
with the northward expansion of the stock, instead maintaining allocations based on past landings.167 
As the ASMFC has eliminated the requirement to reconsider its black sea bass state allocations over 
time,168 it appears to have adopted a preservationist posture with regard to the economic basis of the 
fishing industry rather than allowing harvest to transition with shifting stock geography. This 
approach contrasts with hypothetical transitionalist mechanisms, such as policies that automatically 
shift allocations based on stock geography, as identified by scientific stock assessment. 
3.2.3 Command and Control 
Black sea bass management is largely managed through command-and-control input controls, such 
as gear requirements, minimum size and possession limits, and complex seasons. These elements are 
used to manage allocations to commercial and recreational sectors that are determined by managers 
and do not change from year to year.169 However, as for other fisheries, the status determination 
criteria, including total allowable landings, are determined based on evolving fishery models.170 Thus, 
the black sea bass is typical of other fisheries in that it is a complex system that combines both rigid 
command-and-control elements and flexible, adaptive mechanisms. 
The input controls used to manage black sea bass catch, as implemented both through NOAA and 
state regulations, are typical “end-of-pipe” elements that do appear to limit the ability of the industry 
to adapt to climate change. For example, the regulations for pot construction require two escape 
vents, bound together with one of four types of biodegradable fasteners, with different stipulated 
dimensions (at least 2” x 2” if square, 2.5” in diameter if circular, and 1-3/8” X 5-3/4” if 
rectangular).171 These and other, similarly-specific gear restrictions are used in lieu of market-based 
mechanisms, such as bycatch caps, and do not provide incentives for fishermen in high-availability, 
low-quota areas to avoid catch. Similarly, permitting limitations, such as Rhode Island’s non-
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transferable endorsement172 and the state-by-state quota system, also limit the ability of black sea 
bass fishermen to trade fishing rights as the stock moves geographically. As a result, fishermen in 
high-availability areas are limited in their ability to access a newly-abundant resource.  
Black sea bass management is rigid in some respects—notably, through its state quota allocations—
but it does enable modification of technological input controls through flexibility mechanisms. 
Specifically, managers are authorized to modify conservation and management measures through an 
abbreviated framework adjustment process adopted under Amendment 12 to the black sea bass 
FMP.173 The framework adjustment process enables managers to add and modify other management 
measures without the need for a full FMP amendment174—a process that has been used nine times 
to date since 1999.175 ASMFC, though not its federal counterpart, can also issue addenda to alter 
stock management provisions applicable in state waters—an option used 27 times to date for black 
sea bass.176 
Finally, the black sea bass fishery management appears to effectively be addressing its informational 
deficits. While historically a data-poor fishery, the fishery has adopted a new stock assessment model 
and associated status determination criteria, as previously discussed. The fishery also incorporates 
buffers to account for uncertainty in information.177 For the 2017 season, for example, the 
overfishing limit was set at 12.05 million pounds, whereas the acceptable biological catch was set at a 
combined 10.47 million pounds.178 This buffer protects the stock from becoming depleted should 
management assumptions prove to be incorrect. 
3.2.4 Principled Flexibility 
The black sea bass fisheries management has not adopted explicit provisions to distinguish between 
controllable and uncontrollable change in the fishery or adopted management principles to guide its 
decisions in adapting to those changes. As a result, the elements of black sea bass management that 
embody principled flexibility do so implicitly, such as through incorporation of buffers and 
incorporation of climate science into stock assessment models. Managers recognized in 2002 that 
the stock was shifting northwards when it established its state allocations,179 but it has not addressed 
continuing shifts since that time—a contrast to other fisheries, such as summer flounder, which has 
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shifted more dramatically as a consequence of a successful rebuilding process.180 Similar 
consideration of the effects of changing stock dynamics would be needed to fully incorporate 
principled flexibility concepts into black sea bass fishery management. 
4 Conclusion 
Fisheries are changing over time due to climate change in ways that may strain federal and regional 
management systems. Legal theorists have considered how climate change may affect regulatory 
systems and have suggested several ways in which laws and regulations may not be capable of 
adapting to changing circumstances and how they may be able to do so more effectively. They have 
argued that legal frameworks are based on an assumption that conditions vary within an envelope 
that can be assessed from historical conditions, but that climate change is creating change that has 
no analogue in past experience. They similarly argue that legal frameworks are based on the idea of 
preserving the past in perpetuity rather than allowing the transitions that will be needed as 
conditions change. Third, they argue that command-and-control systems are not adaptable because 
they are rigid, focused on specific technology, and created without sufficient information. Finally, 
when they do adapt, those adaptations are not based on considered policy guidance.  
This paper has evaluated whether and how federal and regional fisheries legal frameworks reflect 
each of these criticisms. As other commentators have noted, domestic fisheries management is a 
complex system that incorporates adaptive management in some ways while in others is linked to 
historical baselines and models. Close consideration of specific procedural and substantive aspects 
of fisheries legal frameworks is therefore needed to understand whether and how they enable 
adaptive management in the face of climate change.  
Consideration of how legal frameworks are implemented in the context of particular fisheries is 
important to determine the adaptive capacity of fisheries management in practice. As the black sea 
bass fishery illustrates, regional and federal fisheries management structures are adapting to climate-
related changes through enhanced stock assessment models and status determination criteria. 
However, additional development and evolution, such as development of mechanisms for 
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recalibration of management responsibility and state landings allocations, will be needed for the 
fishery to meet the climate challenge. Proactive management and legal development would be 
required for black sea bass management—and fisheries management more broadly—to fully 
embody the principled flexibility approach and maximize climate resilience. 
